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In this paper we present evidence from high-frequency data collections dedicated to tracking the effects
of the financial crisis and great recession on American households.  These data come from surveys
that we conducted in the American Life Panel – an Internet survey run by RAND Labor and Population.
The first survey was fielded at the beginning of November 2008, immediately following the large
declines in the stock market of September and October 2008.  The next survey followed three months
later in February 2009.  Since May 2009 we have collected monthly data on the same households.
This paper shows the levels and trends of many of these data which summarize the experience and
expectations of households during the recession.
We find that the effects of the recession are widespread: between November 2008 and April 2010
about 39 percent of households had either been unemployed, had negative equity in their house or
had been in arrears in their house payments.  Reductions in spending were common especially following
unemployment. On average expectations about stock market prices and housing prices are pessimistic,
particularly long-run expectations.  Among workers, expectations about becoming unemployed have
recovered somewhat from their low point in May 2009 but still remain high.  Overall the data suggest















According to the Case-Shiller 20-city average housing price index, housing prices reached a 
maximum in May 2006.  Problems in the housing market associated with the subsequent decline 
in prices and with the relaxed lending standards during the run-up in prices spread to the 
financial sector leading to the financial crisis.  At the beginning of the crisis unemployment was 
quite low:  in December 2007 when the economy entered recession the rate was just 5%.  
However, housing prices continued to decline and stock prices, which had been increasing as 
measured by the S&P500, began to decline in October 2007.  By October 31, 2008 the S&P500 
was down 37% from a year earlier and it had dropped 17% in the month of October 2008 alone.  
The Case-Shiller index was down 18% from a year earlier.  The unemployment rate was 6.2% in 
September 2008 up from 4.7% in September 2007 but the increase was modest relative to the 
problems associated with the financial crisis.  However, the unemployment rate increased to 
6.6% in October, to 6.9% in November and to 7.4% in December 2008.  The financial crisis had 
become the Great Recession. 
  The effects of this recession are likely different from prior recessions because of 
simultaneous shocks in the stock market, the housing market and the labor market.  For example 
in the recession of 1981-1982 the unemployment rate increased from 7.2% to 10.8% but housing 
prices were approximately constant and the stock market rose.  In the short recession of 2001 
associated with the stock market crash, the unemployment rate increased from 4.3% to 5.5%, but 
housing prices increased by about 4%.  Besides the simultaneity of the shocks, circumstances 
have changed.  The transition from a DB pension world to a DC pension world meant that the 
retirement assets of more older workers were affected by a stock market decline.  Balloon loans 
and small or no down payments for houses meant that many faced increasing mortgage payments 
even as they had negative equity.  Younger or lower paid workers were admitted into the housing 
market during the boom years, but that same group was more likely to be subsequently 
unemployed: not being able to make their house payments, many were foreclosed.  The sharp 
decline in the stock market reduced the buffer that might have ameliorated distress from the 
housing or labor market. 
In this paper we present results about the effects of the economic crisis and recession on 
American households.  They come from high-frequency surveys dedicated to tracking the effects 
of the crisis and recession that we conducted in the American Life Panel – an Internet survey run 
by RAND Labor and Population.  The first survey was fielded at the beginning of November 
2008, immediately following the large declines in the stock market of September and October.  
The next survey followed three months later in February 2009.  Since May 2009 we have 
collected monthly data on the same households.  
  Our main measures are actual spending, unemployment, home equity, affect and mood, 
and expectations about the stock market, the housing market and unemployment.  While there is 
some variation in the time path of these measures, mostly they declined from the beginning of 
our surveys and continued to decline beyond June 2009, the official end of the recession, 
reaching their low points in June-November 2009.  Since then, they have shown little 
improvement.  If we define recession to be a period of negative change, from the point of view of 
American households the recession has ended.  If we define it in terms of levels, the recession is 
not over and shows few signs of ending. 
 
2. The American Life Panel    3
 
  The American Life Panel (ALP) is an ongoing Internet panel survey of about 2500 
persons operated and maintained by RAND Labor and Population.  Panel members are recruited 
from respondents to the University of Michigan Survey Research Center’s Monthly Survey 
(MS).  The MS incorporates the long-standing Survey of Consumer Attitudes and produces the 
Index of Consumer Expectations. Each month, the MS interviews approximately 500 
households, of which 300 are a random-digit-dialed sample and 200 are reinterviewed from the 
RDD sample surveyed six months previously.  The MS survey is considered to have good 
population representation (Curtin, Presser, and Singer, 2005).  At the end of an MS interview, 
respondents are asked to participate in the ALP; about 80% of MS respondents asked have 
agreed to participate.  Those who do not have access to the Internet are provided with a Web TV 
(www.webtv.com/pc/), including an Internet access subscription with an e-mail account.  
Accordingly the sample does not suffer from selection due to a lack of Internet access.
1  Post-
stratification weights are provided so that after weighting, the ALP approximates the 
distributions of age, sex, ethnicity, education, and income in the Current Population Survey.  
About once a month, respondents receive an email request to visit the ALP website to complete 
questionnaires that typically take no more than 30 minutes to finish. Respondents are paid an 
incentive of about $2 per three minutes of survey time.  Response rates are typically between 80 
and 95% of the enrolled panel members, depending on the topic, the time of year, and how long 
a survey is kept in the field. 
  The ALP has conducted a large number of longitudinal surveys of its respondents, so that 
over time it has collected data on a very wide range of covariates.  For example, ALP 
respondents have been asked about their financial knowledge, their retirement planning, and 
hypothetical questions designed to reveal parameters such as risk aversion.  They have been 
given the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) survey instrument in modules one at a time over 
an extended period, so that we have responses to the wide range of HRS health queries and to the 
HRS cognitive battery. Most importantly, respondents were administered the HRS wealth 
module in November 2008, shortly after our first survey.
2   
A strength of the ALP is that it takes advantage of Internet technology.  There is a short 
turn-around time between questionnaire design and the fielding of a survey, facilitating rapid 
responses to new events or insights.  Thus, surveys can be operated at high frequency, reducing 
risk of missing events or the effects on households.  This speed is in sharp contrast to the large 
household surveys such as the HRS where the time from planning to fielding can be as much as a 
year, and the time from fielding to data availability can exceed a year. 
 
The Financial Crisis Surveys  
 
  The very large stock market declines in October 2008 prompted our first data collection.  
We designed a survey that was administered to the ALP in November 2008.  The survey covered 
a broad range of topics, including various dimensions of life satisfaction, self-reported health 
measures and indicators of affect, labor force status, retirement expectations, recent actual job 
loss and chances of future job loss, housing, financial help (received and given and expectations 
                                                 
1 This approach has been used successfully in the Dutch CentER panel for many years. 
2 As of this writing the ALP respondents have not yet been administered the HRS asset module a second time, so we 
are lacking two longitudinal observations on wealth over a crucial period of the economic crisis.  Funding is pending 
for the second asset measurement planned for October 2010.   4
about these), stock ownership and value (including recent losses); recent stock transactions 
(actual and expected over the next 6 months); expectations about future stock market returns 
(one year ahead, 10 years ahead); spending changes; credit card balances and changes in the 
amounts carried over; impact of the financial crisis on retirement savings; and expectations about 
future asset accumulation.  We followed up with a second longitudinal interview in late February 
2009 covering approximately the same topics.  
In our first survey (November 2008) 73 percent of households reported they had reduced 
spending because of the economic crisis.  These spending reductions are of substantial policy 
and scientific interest, and so there is considerable value in a careful measurement of the 
magnitude of the reductions.  For example the welfare implications of the crisis depend partially 
on the reduction in consumption.  Furthermore, because of the lack of knowledge of how 
spending responds to economic shocks at high frequency, it is important to establish the 
empirical connection between the triggering events and the magnitude of consumption 
reductions. The wide-spread spending reductions prompted us to re-orient the survey, expanding 
the collection of information on the components of spending.   
Beginning with the May 2009 interview we established a monthly interview schedule to 
reduce the risk of recall error about spending and to collect data at high frequency on items such 
as employment, satisfaction, mood, affect and expectations.  An objective was to permit detailed 
sequencing of events and their consequences.
3   
Each month we ask about spending in 25 categories during the previous month.  These 
categories comprise about 70% of total spending.  Every third month beginning in July 2009 we 
ask about spending during the previous three months on an additional 11 categories.  Spending in 
these categories tends to be less frequent such as durables. Taken together, the monthly and 
quarterly surveys measure total spending over a three-month period.  This three-month schedule 
of two shorter monthly surveys and a longer quarterly survey has continued to the present.
4  
These surveys have several unique aspects.  The first and most obvious is that they are 
monthly panel surveys.  This design permits the observation of the immediate effects of changes 
in the economic environment that cannot be captured in low frequency surveys via retrospection.  
A second unique aspect is our measurement of total spending on a monthly basis.  This 
measurement reduces recall bias for high frequency purchases, yet because the surveys cover an 
entire year, this measurement also captures low frequency purchases.  A third unique aspect is 
the elicitation of subjective probabilities at a high frequency.  In this design both the 
determinants and the effects of subjective probabilities can be estimated.  A fourth aspect is the 
elicitation of measures of mood and affect that respond quickly to economic events. 
  A total of 2,693 respondents participated in at least one of the 14 interviews from 
November 2008 through April 2010.  The retention rate in the panel interviews has been high:  
73.0 percent (N=1,966) responded to 10 or more interviews and 40.7 percent (N=1,096)  
responded to all 14 waves.  The high retention rate is partly due to respondents being invited to 
continue to participate in the surveys even if they miss one or more of the interviews.     
                                                 
3 To further reduce recall error the survey is only available to respondents for the first 10 days of each month except 
when the first day of the month falls on a weekend.  Then the schedule is shifted by a day or two to accommodate 
staff work schedules.  Thus state variables such as unemployment refer to approximately the first 10 days of a 
month, not the entire month. 
4 Information about the surveys is given in Appendix Table 1, including survey length, fielding schedule and  
response rates.   5
In this paper we use data from 14 surveys covering the period November 2008 through 
April 2010.  In the interest of maintaining an adequate sample size while at the same time basing 
results on an approximate panel sample, we admit into the sample for panel analyses respondents 
who missed at most four of the interviews.
5   
 
 
3. Indicator of financial distress 
  The main focus of the surveys is the effects of the financial crisis and the subsequent 
recession on the economic well-being of households and on their reactions to the economic 
shocks.  As a summary measure of the immediate effects we say that a household is experiencing 
financial distress if the respondent and/or spouse is unemployed, or if the household is more than 
two months behind on mortgage payments (or in foreclosure), or if the value of the house is less 
than the amount of the mortgage.
6  Table 1 shows in each wave the percentage of households in a 
panel sample that experienced financial distress.  At the time of the initial survey 13.2% were in 
financial distress, and in the last survey in April 2010 16.8% were in financial distress.  We fit a 
regression line to these percentages and find an increase of 0.15% per month from the regression 
or 2.6% cumulative over 17 months.  The second column of the table shows the cumulative 
measure; that is, the percentage of households that since the first interview in November 2008 
were in financial distress in at least one of the surveys.  By April 2010, 39% of households had 
experienced financial distress.  Thus the effect of the recession as measured by the fraction of 
households experiencing financial distress is not improving and it is widespread.  This is to be 
expected because unemployment has not declined by any important amount and housing prices 
are approximately constant at levels much below their peaks in many cities.   
Those with lower incomes are more likely to experience financial distress:  the rate is 
22% among households in the lowest income quartile but just 13% in the highest income quartile 
(not shown).  Younger people are more likely to be in households in financial distress:  23% of 
those aged 18-34 are in households in distress versus 8% aged 60-69.





  Whether home owners have been affected by the large drops in home values, and how 
seriously they have been affected, depends on where they live and when they bought their home.  
Figure 1 shows Case-Shiller house price indices normalized to 100 in January 2003 for a 20-city 
                                                 
5 Results that use the spending data are based on the third through the 14
th wave.  A total of 2,623 respondents 
answered at least one of these 12 interviews.  Among these, 48.2 percent (N=1,264) participated in all 12 waves.  In 
the panel analysis of spending we include respondents who missed at most four of the 12 interviews.  This 
restriction is met by 77.8 percent or 2,041 respondents.   Thus the sample used for spending analyses is slightly 
different from the sample based on all 14 waves. 
6 This measure of immediate financial distress does not account for households who have fallen behind with rent 
payments because we did not initially collect this information.  In later waves very few households report being 
more than two months behind with rent payments, so the omission is not expected to affect the results in a material 
manner.  For longitudinal consistency of the measure of financial distress we excluded the event of “being behind 
with rent payments” from all waves.  
7 The statistics by age band and by income quartile are based on pooled observations from all waves.  Income 
quartiles are based on households’ average income computed over the entire survey period, stratified by marital 
status (single vs. couple households).   6
average and for four representative cities, Phoenix, Los Angeles, Denver and Detroit. The 20-
city average peaked in May 2006 at about 50% above its level at the beginning of 2003.  Since 
reaching its peak it has fallen to about that initial 2003 level.  The average conceals substantial 
intercity variation.  As is evident in the graph, in Denver there was a moderate increase in 
housing prices, followed by a small decline, but this variation is not remarkable compared with 
historical price changes.  In Los Angeles or Phoenix, by contrast, there were dramatic swings in 
home prices.  However, the consequences of these price changes depend importantly on the date 
of purchase.  Consider a family who bought a house in 2003.  Although the value of the home is 
now below its 2006 peak of twice the purchase price, it is, nonetheless, at the 2003 level.  
Provided the mortgage was reasonable in relation to family income, this family could have sound 
finances, even having paid off some of the principal on the loan.  However, if a family bought at 
the top of the market with a small percentage down payment and a balloon loan, it would find 
itself with substantial negative home equity and increased mortgage costs which might be 
unaffordable. 
It is noteworthy that substantial declines in housing prices are not limited to bubble 
markets.  A family buying a home in Detroit in late 2003 would now see a decline in value of 
about 40%.  The downturn in the auto industry and the departure of other large employers, such 
as Pfizer, have taken their toll. 
Our survey asks respondents about the value of their houses.  These data have the virtue 
of being reports on the same house over time and of being nationally representative.  Other 
commonly used data sources are based on recent actual property sales (possibly including 
refinanced properties) or in the Case-Shiller index confined to 20 large cities. Table 2 shows 
mean and median cross-section house values.  We note that the ALP statistics are similar to those 
reported in the Federal Housing Finance Agency "Monthly House Price Indexes for Census 
Divisions and U.S. Purchase-Only Index” which is the only index available on a monthly basis.
8  
The reports from ALP respondents show a decline:  Based on the regression of the log house 
value on calendar time, both the mean and median value declined by about 0.4% per month for a 
cumulative decline of about 7% over the 17 month period.  This change does not account for 
inflation.  While it does represent a decline in the most important asset of many households, it is 
not nearly as large as might be expected from the publicity about the crisis in the housing market. 
However, most of the losses in housing value were prior to our initial survey.  Additionally only 
a subset of cities experienced very large declines in property values, but because of the 
prominence of the Case-Shiller Index they tended to receive considerable publicity which may 
have distorted expectations.  This selective publicity may explain why respondents rate their 
local housing market more favorably than the housing market in the U.S. as a whole.
9   
We ask respondents about the value of their mortgages which allows us to calculate the 
percentage of owners with negative equity.  These percentages of homeowners with negative 
equity are more representative of the population than those obtained from sources such as lenders 
or property records which are either incomplete or outdated.  In Nov 2008, 5.6% of homeowners 
owed more than their house was worth.  By Feb 2009 this percentage had increased to 8.1%.  
                                                 
8 The “All Transactions Index,” which uses sales prices and appraisals but is only available quarterly, shows 
somewhat higher appreciation than the purchases only index. 
9 This finding is based on questions asking respondents to rate on a 5-point scale the “housing market in the U.S. as 
a whole” and then the “housing market in [your] area.”  The fraction rating the U.S. housing market as fair or poor 
(85.9%) is persistently 20 percentage points higher than the fraction rating the local housing market as fair or poor 
(65.8%).   7
After that there has been little trend in this percentage, hovering between 8 and 9 percent of 
homeowners in each wave whether measured in cross-section or in panel.
10  Younger 
homeowners were much more likely to have negative home equity: 12.4% of homeowners under 
age 50 had negative equity compared with 5.2% among those 50 or older.  Although negative 
home equity may not in itself lead to financial trouble, it makes the household vulnerable to 
other economic shocks such as unemployment.  Unemployment tends to be greater among 
younger households.  
A common measure of noncompliance with mortgage payments is being more than two 
months behind on payments.  Table 3 shows that in panel data the number of such households 
reached a peak of 5% in October 2009 and has fallen since then to 3.8% in April 2010.   
People with negative home equity do not keep up their mortgage payments as well as 
those with positive equity.  Those with negative home equity are over 6 times as likely to be 
behind on their mortgage payments.  Those falling behind are at great risk of losing their homes, 
lacking equity for possible refinancing.  The observed negative equity positions therefore suggest 
further foreclosures in the future.   
We asked respondents who were homeowners and had a mortgage whether they were 
being foreclosed.  The fraction in foreclosure reached its peak in October 2009 with 2.7% and 
then declined. It was 1.3% in January 2010, and 1.2% in April 2010.  Cumulating the 
foreclosures over time starting with the first survey in November 2008 through April 2010 we 
find that among those who had a mortgage at some time during this period, 4.8% had gone 




House price expectations 
 
  Respondents are asked about expectations of price appreciation in the form of a 
subjective probability as follows: 
On a scale from 0 percent to 100 percent where 0 means that 
you think there is no chance and 100 means that you think 
the event is absolutely sure to happen, what do you think 
are the chances that by next year at this time your home 
will be worth more than it is today.  
  
In addition the quarterly surveys ask the same question but with a time horizon of five years. 
Table 4 shows the average subjective probabilities.  The most notable feature of the 
results is the very pessimistic expectations.  The mean and median subjective probability of a 
gain over the next 12 months was about 40% in May 2009 through July 2009, indicating that, 
according to respondents’ beliefs, a decline in prices was more likely than a gain in prices.  
Households holding that view are likely to be conservative in spending or in borrowing against 
the value of their house. These expectations are very much at odds with historical frequencies.  
Based on changes in the monthly house price index of the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
"Monthly House Price Indexes for Census Divisions and U.S. Purchase-Only Index” the 
                                                 
10 Among homeowners with a mortgage about 12% had negative equity. 
11 In cumulating the observations of experiencing foreclosure over time we include respondents who have missed 
some waves.     8
estimated probability of a gain in house value over one year would be 88%.
12  One explanation 
for this discrepancy is that the past offers little guidance to the future due to the exceptional 
nature of the recession.  A second, more general explanation, is that expectations of future price 
changes are dependent on recent price changes as has been found for stock market expectations 
(Hurd, 2009).   
One-year expectations increased between February 2009 and May 2009. Between May 
2009 and January 2010 housing prices were approximately constant (Table 2) and one-year 
average expectations were also approximately constant.  But in April 2010 the median 
probability of a one-year gain declined to just 30%, possibly reflecting recent declines in 
reported housing values. 
While five-year expectations are greater than 50% they still show considerable pessimism 
and are at odds with historical price changes:  the historical estimate based on the “Monthly 
House Price Indexes” is 100%.
13  That is, in every five-year interval since 1992 (taken month-
by-month) house prices have increased.  In distinction to one-year expectations, five-year 
expectations were lower in April 2010 than in February 2009.  Apparently people have become 
somewhat more optimistic about the short-run as measured by the one-year expectations while at 








  In normal times, most people should expect approximately stable spending over a six 
month horizon. To the extent that they anticipate changes, most of the changes would be positive 
because spending increases with age until old age.  In addition nominal spending should increase 
over time both because of inflation and because of increases in incomes.  However, in November 
2008 just 8% of respondents expected an increase in spending over the next six months whereas 
about 20% expected a decrease (Table 5).   The low point was reached in February 2009 where 
22% expected a decrease.  The expectations of a decrease likely resulted from pessimism about 
the stock market and the housing market, heightened concerns about unemployment, and about 
the vulnerability of income. By the metric of expected spending change, the low point of the 
recession was reached in about February or March 2009 which coincided with the low point of 
the stock market and a cessation in the decline in house prices. 
Expectations are now stable with more expecting an increase than a decrease.  This does 
not necessarily mean that people have become more optimistic about the future course of the 
economy: it could be that spending has been reduced to a level such that people do not expect 
that further reductions are necessary.   
There is a remarkable match between expectations of spending change and recollections 
of actual change.  Respondents were asked in July 2009 about whether they had reduced 
spending over the preceding six months.  Table 6 shows expectations of spending change 
                                                 
12 Calculated as the percentage of 12-month intervals over which the housing price index increased between January 
1, 1991 to November 1, 2009. 
13 Calculated as the percentage of five-year intervals over which the housing price index increased between January 
1, 1991 to November 1, 2009.   9
collected in February 2009 with recollections of spending change collected in July 2009 in panel.   
Although the temporal comparison is not completely exact, the expectations were very accurate 
when they are compared with recollections. 
 
 
Self-reported spending changes 
 
  In Wave 1, 73% of respondents said they reduced spending because of the financial 
problems in the economy.  In Wave 2, 30% said spending was lower compared to spending in 
November 2008.  We found little variation in reported spending reductions by age and income 
except that fewer reduced spending among those aged 60+ and fewer reduced spending in the 
highest income quartile.  Many respondents reduced spending on health care such as doctor visits 
and prescription drugs (self-reports):  in wave 1, 22% said they had reduced such spending over 
the last 6 months and in wave 2, 25% since the November 2008 interview.  These reductions in 
health care spending may lead, of course, to negative health consequences over the longer term. 
  In the climate of the recession it is natural to think that reductions in spending are due to 
reduced economic resources or to pessimistic expectations about future economic resources such 
as an increased likelihood of unemployment and the associated reduction in income.  But 
spending reductions could also reflect changes in “needs” such as changes in family 
composition.  Similarly spending could increase because of an unanticipated increase in 
resources or because of increased requirements for spending due to, say, higher out-of-pocket 
spending for health care.  To separate changes in actual or anticipated resources from changes in 
needs, we asked about the reasons for spending changes. 
Among those who reported an increase in spending we find a combination of an increase 
in economic resources and an increase in spending requirements.  Of particular interest is that in 
the 2009 interviews 24% of households reported an increase due to higher required mortgage 
payments;  this percentage declined to 19% in the 2010 interviews.  However, there was a 
substantial decline in the percentage reporting an increase in spending because of increases in 
economic resources or better employment.    
 
Reasons for Increase in Spending among those Reporting an Increase.   
Percent indicating “very or moderately important” 
 Earlier  quarterly 
interviews 




increase in income or wealth  47.1  34.7 
better actual employment  32.9  20.7 
higher required mortgage payments  24.1  18.6 
other increased spending needs  86.1  80.3 
Percent of respondents reporting increase in 
spending since previous quarterly interview  11.7%  13.0% 
N 648-654  517-522 
Note:  Respondents could check more than one reason. 
 
Among those who reported a reduction in spending, about 80% cited a need to reduce debt and 
68% cited a reduction in income.  According to the self reports, the decline in stocks and in the   10
house value directly led to a reduction in spending.  There was little change in these percentages 
between the earlier and later waves.  However, the overall percentage of households that reduced 
spending was lower in the 2010 interviews than in the 2009 interviews.  Possibly prior reductions 
in spending were deemed sufficient by some households so that further reductions were not 
necessary in the later waves.  But the lower percentage of households is also consistent with the 
improvement in expectations reported in Table 5, and with stabilized conditions. 
 
Reasons for a Decrease in Spending among hose Reporting a Decrease. 
Percent indicating “very or moderately important” 
 Earlier  quarterly 
interviews 




need to reduce debt  81.1  78.6 
reduction in income  68.5  67.7 
change in employment status  46.2  45.6 
decrease in value of stock holdings  35.0  39.7 
decrease in housing value (homeowners only)  46.0  48.8 
Percent of respondents reporting decrease in 
spending since previous quarterly interview  26.1%  16.8% 
N  1656-1660 656-658 





  Because of the large and wide-spread declines in spending reported in the first two 
surveys we began in the May 2009 interview to ask detailed questions about amounts spent in the 
preceding month.  Our strategy was to ask about spending in 25 categories that are purchased at 
high to middle frequency every month.  Then, every three months we asked about the purchase 
over the past three months of 11 more infrequently purchased categories.  With possibly a few 
minor exclusions the total of the three monthly surveys and the quarterly survey add to total 
spending over the quarter. 
  The 25 categories queried in the monthly surveys are shown in Appendix Table 2 
grouped as they would have been displayed.  The grouping by broad types of spending or by 
frequency of spending is meant to facilitate placement of reported amounts in the proper 
category:  Respondents are sometimes unsure about category placement and they are helped by 
seeing other possibly relevant categories.  The grouping should reduce the risk of either omission 
or double counting.  For example, the following categories were displayed at the same time 







Heating fuel for the home   11
Telephone, cable, Internet 
Car payments: interest and principal 
 
A major innovation was the development of a “reconciliation” screen.  Outliers are a 
problem in self-administered data collection such as Internet interviewing because there is no 
interviewer to question extreme values.  Therefore, we designed a new strategy for the ALP to 
help with outliers:  following the queries about spending last month on the 25 items we presented 
the respondent with a summary table which listed the responses and added them to produce the 
implied monthly spending total.  The respondent was invited to correct any items.  This produced 
two very favorable results.  Item nonresponse was reduced from an already low level to a trivial 
level:  in the initial survey of spending (May09) the maximum item nonresponse (rent) was 
reduced from 2.6% to 0.7%, and in the following wave the maximum item nonresponse (again 
rent) was reduced from 2.7% to 0.9%.
14  The maximum rate of item nonresponse over all 25 
items following the summary table was 0.8% in May09 and 0.9% in June09.  This means that 
almost no imputation for missing values is required.  The second favorable result was a sharp 
reduction in outliers.   Combining both waves, the standard deviation of total spending (on the 25 
items) was reduced from $14,045 to $5,624. The reduction was the result of a small number of 
revisions, on average 2.5% of responses in each category of spending.  However, eliminating 
outliers in each category has an enormous impact on standard errors of the total that is 
constructed as the sum of these 25 spending categories.  The importance of a reduction of this 
size can be seen directly in standard errors in models that explain spending:  roughly speaking 
the standard errors on estimated coefficients in regression models will be reduced by a factor of 
about 2.5, making estimates that were formerly marginally significant, highly significant.  See 
Appendix Table 4 for more details. 
 
Comparison with the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
  The CEX has the most authoritative survey measure of spending at the household level, 
and so we would like to compare annual spending in the CEX with annual spending in our 
survey.  However, the latest published tables from the CEX cover the year 2008, which, even 
after adjusting to 2009 prices, will make the comparison with ALP spending data for 2009 
inexact:  based on the trends in spending in our survey to be discussed below and in the decline 
in spending in the National Income and Product Accounts, spending in 2009 was likely lower 
than spending in 2008.  We therefore expect that the price-adjusted level from the CEX for 2008 
will be higher than our more recent spending measure. 
In the ALP we calculate spending over a year by summing spending in the second, third 
and fourth quarters of 2009 and in the first quarter of 2010.  Spending in each quarter is the sum 
of spending on the 25 items that are measured each month plus the 11 additional items that are 
measured every quarter.   
Average spending in 2008 as reported in the CEX was $44,721 (in 2009$);  average 
spending in the ALP was $41,723.  Thus ALP spending is 93% of CEX spending.  In our view 
                                                 
14 In the reconciliation screen, missing items were filled with zeros, and in a very few cases respondents corrected 
these zeros to positive values.  The item nonresponse rates are calculated under the assumption that the remaining 
zeros were affirmed by the respondent.  The remaining missing values are due to some respondents quitting the 
survey before reaching the spending questions.   12
these levels are remarkably similar, particularly because the CEX levels for 2009 will likely be 
lower than the 2008 levels. 
 
Trends in spending 
 
Table 7 has average and median spending in the 25 categories both in cross-section and 
in panel.  There is almost no difference between the cross-section medians and the panel medians 
both with respect to levels and trends, and the only substantive difference between the cross-
section and panel means is in the initial wave.  All show a reduction in spending between April 
2009 (as recorded in the May survey) and March 2010 as recorded in the April survey.  The rates 
of decline based on the regression of log spending on calendar time range from about 0.5 percent 
per month to one percent per month for a cumulative decline of 5-10%.  These, of course, are 
substantial changes in spending over a short time period.  Were income constant, the household 
saving rate would have increased considerably.  Except for the decrease in spending in the first 
four months, the time pattern is unclear:  a minimum was reached in January 2010 but the data 
do not show a definite pattern of increase since then. 
Certain components of spending are of interest as well as the total.  Table 8 shows 
spending on food, disaggregated into food purchased for consumption at home (food in) and 
food purchased away from home such as in restaurants (food out).  As measured at the mean, 
spending for “food in” declined at about 0.5% per month for a total decline of 5.5% whereas 
spending for “food out” declined at a somewhat higher rate.  When measured at the median, 
however, the differences are greater:  median spending for “food in” did not decline at all 
whereas the cumulative decline for “food out” was 33%.  Apparently households substitute for 
(cheaper) eating at home.  It is noteworthy that the declines for total spending on food were close 
to the declines on total spending on the 25 categories (Table 7).  Although food is a necessity, the 
substitution between spending on “food in” and “food out” led to approximately constant budget 
shares on total spending for food. 
  Table 9 has spending on two categories of health care:  prescription drugs and health care 
services such as doctor visits.  The decline in spending on the two components and on the total 
was substantially greater than the decline in spending on the 25 categories, indicating that the 
budget share declined.  The decline is particularly sharp if spending in March 2010 (April 2010 
survey) is excluded:  for example, the median in February 2010 was just half of the level in April 
2009.  Because spending on health care is protective against future health declines, economizing 




  Respondents were asked about ownership and use of credit cards.  Table 10 shows that 
the ownership of credit cards declined by about 0.2% of households per month for a cumulative 
decline of 2.8 percent of households.  At the same time the percentage of credit card holders that 
paid the balance each month and escaped interest charges increased by about 3.8 percent of 
households.  However, credit card debt conditional on carrying debt over from one month to the 
next increased by about $1,000 or 25%.  Averaged over the entire population (not just those that 
carried debt), by February 2010 credit card debt on which interest is assessed had increased by 
$500. At an interest rate of 16% this is an increase in monthly interest payments of $80 per 
month or $960 per year.   13
 
 
6.  Stock Market 
 
  Over the past 20 years defined contribution plans have become an increasingly common 
form of employer-provided pension plans.  As a result the fraction in the population holding 
stocks, even if indirectly in their pension plans, has increased over the years (Curcuru et al. 
(2009)).  The large declines in the stock market at the onset of the financial crisis likely 
threatened retirement security, especially of those near retirement.  We asked in the first two 
waves whether the “recent financial problems in the economy reduced the value of [the 
respondent’s (and/or spouse’s)] retirement savings,” by how much and whether respondents 
actively changed how their retirement savings were invested.  About 28% said that they did not 
have any retirement savings, a response that is naturally most common among younger 
households who have not had much opportunity to accumulate retirement savings.
15  Among 
those with retirement savings, 71 percent reported losses due to financial problems in the 
economy.  This percentage varies substantially by socioeconomic status as measured by 
household income averaged over the entire survey period: in the lowest income quartile 47 
percent reported losses, and in the highest income quartile 93 percent reported losses in their 
retirement savings.   
The self–reported magnitude of the losses was about 20% at the median in November 
2008 and about 30% both at the mean and median by the time of our second interview in 
February 2009.  Since November 2008 the stock market continued to decline until its low point 
in March 2009 when it was about 32% below its early November level.  
Prior research suggests that households rarely rebalance their retirement savings 
portfolios.  See, for example, Agnew et al. (2003),  Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) or Mitchell et al. 
(2006).  However, these findings are based on administrative data from retirement plan providers 
which only record partial retirement asset holdings such as Vanguard proprietary data.  
Furthermore, the findings come from “normal” times when there is no large event prompting 
investors to rebalance their portfolios.  We asked households about “active changes in how 
[their] retirement savings are invested.”  With this question wording we elicit changes in 
households’ entire retirement assets (not just one part of their portfolio).   21% of those with 
retirement savings reported in the February 2009 survey having made “active changes to how 
retirement savings are invested” since the November interview.  This seemed like a large fraction 
over a short period of time—just three months—even  though we do not know what this fraction 
would be in normal times.  Such investment moves may have a large impact on the long term 
performance of portfolios – either through locking in losses by getting out of the stock market in 
response to large declines, or through creating the potential for large gains by getting into the 
stock market at that time.  Beginning in the May 2009 survey we asked detailed questions about 
asset allocation in retirement accounts with special emphasis on whether changes involved 
increasing or decreasing stock market exposure.  The objectives of these questions are twofold: 
first, we wanted to find whether the large fraction of respondents reporting “active changes” to 
their retirement investment allocations would be verified by quantitative measures of investment 
activity.  Second, we wanted to quantify the amount of asset reallocation. 
                                                 
15 Among those under the age of 35, half report not having any retirement savings, while just 5% of those age 70 and 
older reported no retirement savings.     14
 As of May 2009, 64.5 percent of households in our sample had an IRA, 401k, KEOGH 
or similar retirement saving accounts.  28.6% of retirement account holders had made a change 
in the investment of new funds and/or the allocation of old balances since the beginning of 
October 2008, that is, since the beginning of the financial crisis. Among retirement account 
holders who also responded to wave 1 or wave 2 of the survey the fraction reporting having 
made “active changes” to their retirement savings was 28.0 percent.   
About 10 percent of retirement account holders changed the investment allocation of new 
contributions.  The fraction of respondents that increased the amount of new funds allocated to 
stocks is similar to the fraction that decreased the amount of new funds allocated to stocks (4.6 
percent vs. 5.2 percent, respectively).  However, with respect to reallocations of account balances 
we find that a much larger fraction decreased their exposure to stocks (16.4 percent) than 
increased (6.3 percent).
16  Overall respondents decreased stock holdings in retirement accounts.   
Under unchanging expectations finance theory would call for rebalancing, an increase in stock 
holdings following the long period of losses.  The most obvious explanation for this discrepancy 
is that expectations were not determined by historical averages, but by more recent experience, 
leading to considerable pessimism about the future course of the stock market. 
 
Percent of households making changes to retirement accounts  
(among holders),  
October 2008 to May 2009, N=1,513 
Allocation of new funds    
  increased amount to stocks  4.6 
  decreased amount to stocks  5.2 
Allocation of balances   
  increased amount in stocks   6.3 
  decreased amount in stock   16.4 




Stock market expectations 
 
  We asked about expectations of gains in the stock market in the form of the subjective 
probability that a broad measure of the stock market such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
would be higher in one year than today.
17  We also asked about a gain over a 10-year horizon.  
The one-year subjective probabilities exhibit considerable pessimism:  the average subjective 
probability is just 40% (Table 11).  The historical record for the Dow is that in 70% of the one-
year periods since January 1, 1970 the stock market had a gain, so that an average subjective 
probability based on the historical record should be 70%.  The median probability of a gain was 
50% in most months which implies that the distribution had a fairly fat left tail;  that is, a 
                                                 
16 Bilias et al. (2010) compare trends in stock market participation before and after the 2000 stock market downturn 
and find that in the first years following the downturn nonparticipants were less likely to enter the stock market 
while there was no sign of substantially higher exit rates.  Their analysis of trading behavior is restricted to stock 
holdings outside of retirement accounts. 
17 The question has the same form as the question about housing price expectations.   15
considerable number of respondents assign a small probability of a gain.  The average subjective 
probability of a gain over a 10-year horizon began at a considerably higher level, almost 61%, 
but then in distinction to the probability of a gain over one year, it has declined by about 10 
percentage points.  The historical probability calculated from all 10-year periods since Jan 1, 
1970 is 93%. 
While the subjective probability of a short-term gain has been approximately constant, 
the subjective probability of a long-term gain has decreased substantially, and the average 
probabilities are much below their historical averages.  Thus the stock market subjective 
probabilities are similar to the housing price subjective probabilities in that both show a 
narrowing of the difference between the long horizon and short horizon probabilities. One 
interpretation is that people are quite pessimistic about the long-run prospects of the economy. 
Under this interpretation households are likely to be conservative in their spending decisions. 
 
 
7.  Health and Affect 
 
  A cost of the financial crisis in terms of well-being is its effect on the emotional and 
physical health of the population.  Respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction about several 
aspects of their lives, about their health and about indicators of happiness or depression.  Table 
12 shows the percentage of respondents who affirmed the lowest two categories on a five point 
scale about life satisfaction, and income and economic satisfaction; that is, it shows the 
percentage who were “dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied.”
 18  For life satisfaction, just 7.1% of 
respondents were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied in May 2009.  Since then the percentage has 
slowly increased reaching a maximum in March 2010.  Dissatisfaction with income or with the 
economic situation is considerably higher with about one-third of respondents expressing 
dissatisfaction.  Except for the initial drop in May 2009, there has been no noticeable trend.  
Table 13 shows the percentage of respondents who affirmed the bottom categories of 
self-rated health and of scales related to happiness and to depressive symptoms.  There are five 
categories of self-rated health and the table shows the percentage who rated their health as fair or 
poor.
19  That percentage initially declined from 16.0% in November 2008 to 13.8% in May 2009.  
Since then the percentage has shown little trend. The next column of the table shows the 
percentage that feel worn out (during past 30 days) all of the time, most of the time, or a good bit 
of the time.
20  There has been no trend in mood according to this measure.  The results about 
happiness (during the last 30 days) show the percentage who were happy none, a little or some of 
the time.  There was improvement between November 2008 and June 2009, but little change 
until the last several interviews when the percentage increased.  About one-third of respondents 
reported moderate to extreme difficultly sleeping in November 2008.
21  There has been a 
substantial reduction in that percentage.  Problems with depression have mostly been 
unchanging.  
                                                 
18 The scale is very satisfied, satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, dissatisfied, very dissatisfied. 
19 The self-rated health scale is excellent, very good, good, fair and poor. 
20 The scale for “worn out” and for “happiness” is all of the time, most of the time, a good bit of the time, some of 
the time, a little of the time, none of the time 
21 The scale for difficulty sleeping is none, some, moderate, severe, extreme.   16
Overall, the results for health and affect mainly indicate improvements from November 
2008 to May 2009.  In the subsequent months there has been much less improvement and in 
some cases a worsening. 
 
 
8.  Retirement 
 
  Our survey has not been in the field long enough to observe any substantial number of 
actual retirements.  However, we ask respondents about their subjective probability of working 
past age 62 (P62) and past age 65.  These subjective probabilities have been asked in the HRS 
for many years and they have been shown to be predictive of actual retirement (Hurd, Reti and 
Rohwedder, 2009).  They have an advantage over data on actual retirement because changes in 
the subjective probability control for individual fixed effects such as unmeasured permanent taste 
differences.  Such fixed effects are difficult to control when using actual retirement data.  
  We expect that the financial crisis and subsequent recession could have two opposing 
effects on retirement.  In theory, the decline in stock values should have delayed retirement 
because of the unexpected wealth loss.  However, our survey had not yet been fielded during the 
period of the greatest stock market losses when P62 would have increased the most. The second 
effect on retirement is the worsening of the labor market, and particularly the difficulty of 
finding a job following unemployment in the older population.  The labor market effect would 
likely lead to a reduction in expected retirement age.  The net effect is an empirical matter. 
  Table 14 shows average values of P62 in cross-section for the population 45-61 and for 
selected subpopulations.  For the 45-61 year-olds, whether working or not, the average value of 
P62 was approximately constant from February 2009 to January 2010, but then dropped by 3.3 
percentage points in April 2010.  To put that change in perspective, the labor force participation 
rate of the older population has been increasing during the 1990s and particularly in the 2000s: in 
2003 the rate among those 60-64 was 51%, and the rate was 54.1% in 2008.  The increase over 
five years was 3.1 percentage points about the same as the three-month decline in P62.  If the 
actual labor force participation of ALP respondents is well-predicted by P62, these data suggest 
a sharp reversal of the trend toward higher participation.
22 
  The level of P62 is higher among those 45-52 than among those 53-61 because some in 
the older age group have already retired.  Although the decline in P62 between January 2010 and 
April 2010 occurred in both age groups, disaggregation by work status shows a remarkable 
difference between the two groups.  In the older age group the overall trend as measured between 
February 2009 and April 2010 was moderately negative among those working and moderately 
positive among those not working.  In the younger age group the trend was also negative among 
those working, but it was sharply negative among those not working.  The contrast is greatest 
between July 2009 and April 2010:  P62 was approximately 13 percentage points lower among 
the younger non-workers but two percentage points higher among the older non-workers. This 
decline suggests in increase in pessimism about the future course of the labor market, which is 
likely due to the persistence of  high rates of unemployment. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Whether P62 will be a good prediction of labor force participation at age 62 will depend on the future course of 
the economy.  Should job prospects improve, P62 will likely increase and actual realized labor force participation be 
higher than P62 measured currently   17
9.  Unemployment 
 
We ask respondents about their current labor force status.  As shown in the following 
table, they can check a number of options one of which is "unemployed."    
 
What is your current employment situation? Please check all 
that apply. 
1. Work for pay 
2. Unemployed, looking for work 
3. Temporarily laid off 








Respondents are employed if they check 1, 4 or 8.  They are unemployed if they check 2 or 3.  
The unemployment rate is the number unemployed divided by the sum of the unemployed and 
employed.   
Because the status of being unemployed is subjective, rather than based on specific 
objective activities related to job search as in the Current Population Survey (CPS), our measure 
should include those who consider themselves to be unemployed but have not performed any of 
those activities.  Our measure generally tracks national statistics which come from the CPS but it 
is higher because it includes some who are not actively looking for work.  
We also ask about the labor force status of the spouse so that we are able to calculate a 
household unemployment rate in the case of couples. 
 
Coping with Unemployment 
 
  For most households, unemployment is associated with a substantial loss in income.  
There are many different ways in which households might cope with this reduction in income.   
Broadly speaking the household may alter its spending or it may seek replacements for the loss 
of income.  Which ones a household relies on depends on the household’s circumstances.  
Beginning with the May 2009 survey (wave 3) we asked follow-up questions in case a household 
(respondent and/or spouse) experienced unemployment over the last three months to find out 
how affected households deal with the loss in income.  Table 15 shows the distribution of 
responses.  “Reducing spending” is by far the most wide-spread response used by 85 percent of 
households who experienced unemployment. 46% reduced the amount going into savings.  Not 
paying bills on time is also common. 
Households may also undertake activities to replace the income lost from unemployment 
such as the application for and receipt of unemployment benefits or the support from the 
extended family.  Table 16 shows the distribution of responses by those who experience 
unemployment or by those whose spouses experience unemployment. 
   About one-third of households took money out of savings, and 27% received financial 
help from family or friends.  Forty percent received unemployment benefits.  The low level of   18
benefit receipt is likely due to a combination of variation in how fast laid off workers decide to 
claim benefits, lack of qualification for benefits, and failure to take up benefits.
23   
We distinguish two types of labor supply response to unemployment: efforts by the 
respondent or by the spouse (as reported by the respondent) in reaction to own unemployment;  
efforts by the respondent in reaction to the spouse’s unemployment and by the spouse in reaction 
to the respondent’s unemployment.  A labor supply response was far from universal: to own 
unemployment about 13% of respondents took up a temporary job, and about 9% of spouses who 
became unemployed took up a temporary job.  In addition, about 5-8% of married persons began 
to work or increased hours after their spouses became unemployed.  A likely reason for these 
rather small labor supply responses is that we do not distinguish between short-run and long-run 
responses:  many of the unemployed have been unemployed for just a few weeks and a 
maximum of three months to be asked these follow-up questions.  It is likely that as the 




  Expectations about unemployment as well as actual unemployment should be an 
important component in a household’s determination of spending.  To track expectations about 
unemployment we asked workers about their subjective probability of becoming unemployed in 
the next 12 months.  Table 17 shows the average probability in successive cross-sections.  The 
average probability began at about 20% and increased to almost 22% in May 2010.  If each 
person accurately assessed his or her probability the twelve-month actual fraction of workers 
who would experience unemployment would be 22%.  There has been some improvement since 
then:  based on a fitted regression line the average probability decreased by about 2.2 percentage 
points over the 18 months of our surveys.  The decline is likely due to improvements in the 
housing and stock markets and to the stabilizing of the actual unemployment rate and the 
subsequent modest reduction.   
We can compare the expected percentage who will be unemployed over 12 months with 
the realized percentage who actually became unemployed  by tracing actual unemployment at the 
individual level in the monthly surveys.  The within-person comparison shows that 19.4% 
experienced unemployment between November 2008 and October 2009 (Table 18).  Their 
average subjective probability reported in November 2008 was 20%.  Thus workers predicted 
quite accurately on average what their unemployment experience would be.  In later waves 
workers predicted more unemployment than what was experienced:  for example, in May 2009 
the average subjective probability of unemployment was 22% and the actual was 17%. 
 
Unemployment and home ownership 
 
Table 19 shows the relationships among home ownership, unemployment and mortgage 
delinquency.  In the entire population some 65.5% own a home, but the ownership rate is just 
46.4% among the unemployed.  Despite the lower ownership rate, about 3.5% of the unemployed 
are in arrears on their mortgage payments versus 1.7% in the population. Conditional on owning 
a home, the unemployed are more likely to have a mortgage (79% versus 75%), and, conditional 
                                                 
23 Questions about responses to unemployment are asked only of workers who lost a job some time over the 
previous three months so that the unemployed who are slow to take up benefits are not recorded as receiving them.   19
on having a mortgage, they are more likely to be delinquent (more than two months behind on 
payment) on their mortgage (10% versus 3%).   
Households experiencing unemployment are much more likely to have negative home 
equity than those who are not.  Among homeowners with a mortgage about 12% have negative 
equity compared with 17% of those unemployed.  Although negative home equity does not 
necessarily imply financial difficulties, the combination with unemployment does, as then the 
household risks an inability to make its mortgage payments, and possible loss of the home.  
 
Unemployment and spending 
 
  Prior research has found mixed results with respect to spending changes following 
unemployment, but those studies were based on very different types of data.
24  Our method is to 
classify people according to whether they are initially employed or unemployed.  Then we study 
changes in spending associated with month-to-month transitions between those states.  Table 20 
shows those transitions over the May 2009 to April 2010 waves.  Thus 14,053 respondents were 
employed in adjacent waves.  Among those respondents average spending in the initial wave 
(wave t) was $2,551;  spending was lower in the following wave (wave t+1) by 1.8%  Median 
spending was lower than mean spending, and it declined by about 0.7% between waves t and 
t+1.  The last column shows the median of the household changes and it shows a decline of 
0.3%.  350 persons transited from employed to unemployed. Both mean and median spending by 
their households was lower even when employed (wave t) than spending by households who 
were employed in both waves.  Mean spending in households that became unemployed declined 
by 3.5%. Median spending increased by 2.4% but the median of household level changes was 
negative 2.8%.  At least according to two of the measures, the transition into unemployment was 
accompanied by a greater decline in spending than the transition from employment to 
employment.  However, the transition from unemployment to employment was also associated 
with a decline in spending whereas we would have expected an increase.  Part of the reason for 
this discrepancy is that spending is measured over the prior month during which the respondent 
was unemployed for at least part of the time.  Additionally the adjustment to the new economic 
situation may require some time so that it would appear in later waves. 
  Table 21 presents some alternative evidence about the effects of job loss on spending.  
We asked in the quarterly surveys (July 2009, October 2009, January 2010 and April 2010) 
whether over the previous three months the respondent or spouse had lost a job that he or she 
wanted to keep, and if so, whether any income was lost in association with the job loss.  The 
table shows spending in the month at the beginning of the recall period (wave t-3) and in the 
current month (wave t): thus spending changes are over three months.  This comparison is likely 
more valid than Table 20 because most would have been unemployed during the month when 
spending was measured. 
  Among those who did not report a job loss, spending declined at the mean by 1.7% over 
the three month period or about 0.6 percent per month, and at the median by 1.2% or about 0.4% 
per month.  Particularly when measured at the median the decline in spending was substantially 
higher among those who lost a job and lost income:  the median decline was 10.7%. 
  
                                                 
24 Prominent studies using panel data include Gruber (1997), Gruber (2000), Stephens (2001), Bentolila and Ichino 
(2008) and Sullivan (2008), which tend to find mixed evidence with regard to the size of the response of spending to 
shocks to income and employment.    20
Unemployment and Health and Affect 
 
  Because of stresses associated with job loss we expect that those who became 
unemployed would exhibit symptoms of stress such as sleeplessness.  The unemployed would 
also have a reduction in several domains of satisfaction about life.  Figure 2 shows the change in 
the percentage giving negative reports about these and other aspects of feelings and lives 
according to their labor market transition between two adjacent waves.
25  The upper left graph 
shows that among those who were employed in two adjacent waves about eight percent were 
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their lives and that in the follow-up wave the percent 
dissatisfied declined slightly.  Among those who became unemployed, the percentage expressing 
dissatisfaction with life was higher even when employed, and it increased by about three 
percentage points in the follow-up wave.  Among those who transitioned from unemployment to 
employment the percent expressing dissatisfaction with life declined by half, and among those 
unemployed in two adjacent waves dissatisfaction with life was very high in both waves. 
It is notable that in the graphs about economic and income satisfaction, the fractions 
dissatisfied are much higher than with respect to life satisfaction:  even among those employed in 
two adjacent waves 30-35% expressed dissatisfaction.  The changes accompanying employment 
transitions have the same pattern as those with respect to life satisfaction. 
In general the graphs for sleeplessness, depression, being worn out and feeling happy 
show the same pattern.  The exception is self-rated health: those employed in adjacent waves 
have better health than those unemployed in any wave, but there is no systematic relationship 




Unemployment and Health Insurance 
 
  A particular concern is that those who become unemployed may lose health insurance, 
exacerbating the economic impact of unemployment.  We ask respondents about health 
insurance coverage which may come from own employment or a spouse’s employment.  Table 
22 shows how such coverage is related to employment transitions by showing coverage rates as a 
function of the transition from one month to the next.  For example, 3,231 single persons are 
observed to transit from employed to employed.  Of them, 82.8% had health care insurance in 
the initial wave and 82.9% had such insurance in the succeeding wave.   
Single persons who became unemployed were initially much less likely to have health 
insurance even when employed, and the coverage rate declined by about 23 percentage points on 
becoming unemployed.  This decline is much sharper than for married persons where it was just 
three percentage points.  Part of the difference is, of course, due to spouse coverage.  Part may 
also be due to the greater economic resources of couples where they may be able to afford 
COBRA coverage.  In addition, the impacts in the table are immediate impacts: on average 
newly unemployed respondents had only been unemployed for two weeks as of wave t+1, and 
over longer periods the fraction lacking insurance may increase.  For example, some employers 
may provide temporary coverage as part of a separation package, but this coverage is not 
permanent.   
                                                 
25 The explanation of the scales is given in connection with the discussion of Tables 12 and 13. 
26 The longer-term dynamics of the measures of health, affect and mood undoubtedly show different quantitative 
relationships than the one-month changes shown here.   21
 
 
9.  Conclusions 
 
  The economic problems leading to the recession began with a housing price bubble in 
many parts of the country and a coincident stock market bubble.  These problems evolved into 
the financial crisis.  Following very large declines in the stock market in September and October, 
2008, we fielded our first survey which we called the Financial Crisis survey because at that time 
the news was dominated by the financial problems in the banking sector, the stock market bust, 
and the housing market.  Unemployment had been increasing but it was still at a relatively 
modest 6.9%.  Although we were not in the field to capture the immediate effects of the largest 
part of the stock and housing declines, those prices did decline for a few more months following 
our first survey, so we were able to observe at least some immediate effects.  Even as prices in 
the housing market stabilized and the stock market partially recovered, the unemployment rate 
continued to increase, reaching 10.1% in October 2009.  The financial crisis became the Great 
Recession.  With our monthly surveys we have observed the immediate effects of these large 
changes. 
According to our measures almost 40% of households have been affected either by 
unemployment, negative home equity, arrears on their mortgage payments, or foreclosure.  
Additionally economic preparation for retirement, which is hard to measure, has undoubtedly 
been affected.  Many people approaching retirement suffered substantial losses in their 
retirement accounts:  indeed in the November 2008 survey, 25% of respondents aged 50-59 
reported they had lost more than 35% of their retirement savings, and some of them locked in 
their losses prior to the partial recovery in the stock market by selling out.  Some persons retired 
unexpectedly early because of unemployment, leading to a reduction of economic resources in 
retirement which will be felt throughout their retirement years.  Some younger workers who have 
suffered unemployment will not reach their expected level of lifetime earnings and will have 
reduced resources in retirement as well as during their working years. 
Spending has been approximately constant since it reached its minimum in about 
November, 2009.  Short-run expectations of stock market gains and housing prices gains have 
recovered somewhat, yet are still rather pessimistic; and, possibly more telling, longer-term 
expectations for those price increases have declined substantially and have shown no signs of 
recovery.  The implication is that long-run expectations have become pessimistic relative to 
short-run expectations.   
Expectations about unemployment have improved somewhat from their low point in May 
2009 but they remain high:  they predict that about 18% of workers will experience 
unemployment over a 12 month period.  Despite the public discussion of the necessity to work 
longer, expectations about working to age 62 among those not currently working declined by 10 
percentage points.  In our view this decline reflects long-term pessimism about the likelihood of 
a successful job search. 
The recession officially ended in June 2009.  A main component of that judgment is that 
the economy is no longer declining.  According to our data the economic situation of the typical 
household is no longer worsening which is consistent with the end of the recession defined as 
negative change.  However, when defined in terms of levels rather than rates of change, from the 
point of view of the typical household the Great Recession is not over.   
   22
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Appendix 
 
  To track the effect of the financial crisis on American households, we began collecting 
data in the American Life Panel in November 2008, shortly after the sharp decline in the stock 
market in the preceding month.  The second wave of the survey was administered to the same 
households in late February/early March 2009.  The next wave was conducted in May 2009 
which is when we have adopted a monthly survey schedule: during the first 10 days of every 
month respondents have been asked to complete one of our surveys.  Basic monthly surveys are 
shorter than the first two waves that we conducted, eliciting just a subset of variables.  Every 
three months we administer a long survey.  Appendix Table 1 gives an overview table of the 
survey schedule and response rates. 
 
 
Appendix Table 1: Survey schedule, survey length and response rates 
 
Wave  Survey  Length of survey in 
minutes 
Field period  Responses  Response rate
[%] 
   Mean*  Median       
1 Nov08  19.3  16.6  Initially  unrestricted**  2,056  76.4 
2  Feb09  24.6  21.2  02/24-03/16/09 = 21 days 2,124  79.0 
3  May09  15.0  11.2  05/01-05/10/09 = 10 days 2,086  77.5 
4  Jun09  14.1  11.3  06/01-06/10/09 = 10 days 2,117  78.6 
5  Jul09  26.2  21.8  07/01-07/10/09 = 10 days 2,139  79.4 
6  Aug09  12.2  9.3  08/03-08/12/09 = 10 days 2,123  78.8 
7  Sep09  12.3  9.3  09/01-09/10/09 = 10 days 2,157  80.1 
8  Oct09  27.3  22.8  10/01-10/11/09 = 11 days 2,053  76.2 
9  Nov09  13.9  10.8  11/02-11/11/09 = 10 days 2,082  77.3 
10  Dec09  13.7  11.0  12/01-12/10/09 = 10 days 2,112  78.4 
11  Jan10  27.5  23.3  01/01-01/10/10 = 10 days 2,129  79.1 
12  Feb10  14.9  11.4  02/01-02/10/10 = 10 days 2,123  78.8 
13  Mar10  13.8  10.4  03/01-03/10/10 = 10 days 2,084  77.4 
14  Apr10  26.7  22.4  04/01-04/11/10 = 11 days 2,077  77.1 
* Calculation of average time to complete survey excludes cases with times of 300 min or more who appear to have 
interrupted their survey session. 
**Over 90% of those who responded did so within the first 28 days. 
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Heating fuel for the home 
Telephone, cable, Internet 
Car payments: interest and principal 
 
Screen 2:  
Food and beverages 
Dining and/or drinking out 
Gasoline 
 
Screen 3:  
Housekeeping supplies 
Housekeeping, dry cleaning, and laundry services
Gardening and yard supplies 
Gardening and yard services 
 
Screen 4: 
Clothing and apparel 
Personal care products and services 
Prescription and nonprescription medications 
Health care services 
Medical supplies 
 
Screen 5:  
Tickets to movies, sporting events, performing arts, etc. 
Sports, including gym and exercise equipment such as bicycles, skis, and boats 
Hobbies and leisure equipment 
 
Screen 6:  
Personal services, including cost of care for elderly and/or children, after-
school activities 
Education, including tuition, room and board, books, and supplies 
Other child-related spending, not yet reported, including toys, gear, and 
equipment  
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Appendix Table 3 
 
Additional 11 items queried quarterly beginning in the July survey about spending over previous 
three months 
 
Screen 1:  
Big ticket items  
•  Automobile or truck 
•  Refrigerator 
•  Stove and/or oven 
•  Washing machine and/or dryer 
•  Dishwasher 
•  Television 
•  Computer 
 
Follow-up questions on big ticket items queried amounts, and in the case of cars how 
the purchase was financed. 
 
 
Screen 2:  
Homeowner’s or renter’s insurance 
Property taxes 
Vehicle insurance 
Vehicle maintenance: parts, repairs, etc. 
Health insurance 
 
Screen 3:  
Trips and vacations 
Home repair and maintenance materials 
Home repair and maintenance services 
Contributions to religious, educational, charitable, or political organizations 
Cash or gifts to family and friends outside the household 
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Appendix Table 4: Effect of reconciliation screen on outliers 
 
Maxima and standard deviations in spending before and after revision, May 2009 
  max before max after std dev before std dev after 
Food and beverages in  100,000 7,000 3,809 254 
Food out  150,120 2,500 3,766 135 
Gasoline 8,000 2,000 586 119 
Clothing 3,000 2,000 263 120 
Telecommunication 17,900 1,800 942 72 
   
All 520,490 85,630 14,909 2,332 




Percent of households with indicator of financial distress, panel 
 
 In  month Cumulative 
Nov08 13.2  13.2 
Feb09 15.0  19.3 
May09 16.1  24.6 
Jun09 16.9  27.7 
Jul09 16.6  28.6 
Aug09 17.4  30.9 
Sep09 16.8  33.4 
Oct09 17.2  34.9 
Nov09 16.8  35.2 
Dec09 16.2  36.1 
Jan10 16.1  37.1 
Feb10 16.4  38.4 
Mar10 17.3  39.4 
Apr10 16.8  39.0 
Average monthly change (ppts)  0.15   
Total change Nov08-Apr10 (ppts)  2.6   
Note:  “Panel” consists of individuals who answered 10 or more of the 14 surveys.  Financial 
distress indicator is any of the following:  unemployed, negative equity in house, behind more 
than two months on mortgage, in foreclosure.  Average monthly change based on regression of 
percent of households on calendar time.  Total change is compounded change over 17 months.  
Average N = 1846 
Note:  Age < 50 had cumulative of 48%;  Age > 64 had cumulative of 16% 
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Table 2 
Self-reported housing values, thousands, cross-section 
 Mean Median 
Nov08 248,251 185,000 
Feb09 235,631 175,000 
May09 237,343 183,000 
Jun09 227,694 175,000 
Jul09 236,162 180,000 
Aug09 238,827 180,000 
Sep09 234,421 180,000 
Oct09 228,059 180,000 
Nov09 234,471 175,000 
Dec09 229,619 179,000 
Jan10 246,299 175,000 
Feb10 226,421 175,000 
Mar10 222,672 175,000 
Apr10 222,011 167,000 
Average monthly change (%)  -0.42 -0.33 
Total change Nov08-Apr10 (%)  -7.0 -5.5 
Notes:  Average monthly change based on regression of log house value on calendar time.  
Total change is compounded monthly change over 17 months.  Observations in cross-





Percent of homeowners with mortgage who are currently more than two 













Average monthly change (ppts)  0.02 
Total change May-April (ppts)  0.2 
Notes:  “Panel” consists of individuals who answered 10 or more of the 14 surveys.  
Average monthly change based on regression of percent of homeowners on calendar time.  
Total change is compounded monthly change over eleven months.   Average N = 1018. 




Subjective probability of a housing price gain, 
owners only, cross-section 
 one-year  five-year 
 Mean  Median  Mean Median
Feb09 31.5 25.0  56.4 55.0
May09 38.5  40.0 
June09 38.8  40.0 
July09 38.4 40.0  55.0 50.0
Oct09 39.5 45.0  55.7 55.0
Jan10 39.3  50.0  53.6 50.0
Apr10 36.3 30.0  51.3 50.0







Anticipations of spending change over next six months, 
percentage of respondents, cross-section 
 N  Increase  Same Decrease All
Nov08 2053  8.3 71.3 20.4 100.0
Feb09 2116 11.6  66.7 21.6 99.9
Jul09 2115  13.4  70.8 15.8 100.0
Oct09 2029 16.7  70.6 12.7 100.0
Jan10 2085  16.9  71.0 12.0 99.9









Anticipations of spending change over next six months and 
recollections of actual spending change over previous six months, 
percent of respondents, weighted, panel.   
 Higher Same Lower All
Expectations, Feb/Mar 2009  9.4 67.0 23.5 99.9
Recollections, July 2009  10.1 65.9 24.1 100.1
N= 1093 
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Table 7 
Monthly spending on 25 categories, seasonally adjusted 
 cross-section  panel 
Month of survey  Mean Median Mean  Median
May09 2,639 2,069 2,585  2,020
Jun09 2,364 1,971 2,364  1,963
Jul09 2,465 1,955 2,403  1,943
Aug09 2,225 1,881 2,224  1,875
Sep09 2,374 1,884 2,386  1,866
Oct09 2,381 1,942 2,394  1,897
Nov09 2,140 1,808 2,125  1,802
Dec09 2,147 1,826 2,125  1,815
Jan10 2,256 1,796 2,210  1,762
Feb10 2,376 1,980 2,345  1,933
Mar10 2,313 1,979 2,284  1,965
Apr10 2,214 1,881 2,189  1,868
Average monthly change (%)  -1.0 -0.5 -1.0 -0.5
Total change (%)  -9.9 -4.9 -10.2 -5.0
Notes:  “Panel” consists of individuals who answered 10 or more of the 14 surveys.  Spending refers to the 
month prior to the survey month.  Average monthly change based on regression of log spending on calendar 
time.  Total change is compounded monthly change over 11 months.  Observations in cross-section vary 
between 2025 and 2130.  Observations in panel average 1894.  
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Table 8 
Monthly spending on food at home, food away from home (dining out), and total, panel 
 Mean  Median 
Month of survey  Food in Food out Total Food in Food out  Total
May09 352 140 492 300 100  440
Jun09 332 130 462 300 100  400
Jul09 330 123 453 300 100  400
Aug09 316 119 435 300 80  375
Sep09 312 117 429 300 80  390
Oct09 322 119 441 300 80  400
Nov09 314 114 427 300 70  375
Dec09 313 109 422 300 65  375
Jan10 337 121 458 300 75  400
Feb10 316 105 421 300 60  375
Mar10 317 108 424 300 70  379
Apr10 320 116 436 300 80  385
Average monthly change (%)  -0.5 -1.8 -0.9 0.0 -3.6  -0.8
Total change (%)  -5.5 -17.5 -9.0 0.0 -32.8  -8.3
Notes:  “Panel” consists of individuals who answered 10 or more of the 14 surveys.  Spending refers to the month 
prior to the survey month.  Average monthly change based on regression of log spending on calendar time.  Total 
change is compounded monthly change over eleven months. Observations average 1894.  
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Table 9 
Monthly spending on prescription drugs, health care services, and total, panel 
 Mean  Median 






May09 60 109 169 30 15 70
Jun09 62 88 150 26 0 57
Jul09 50 92 142 20 0 50
Aug09 51 88 139 20 0 45
Sep09 48 65 113 20 0 40
Oct09 50 72 123 22 0 45
Nov09 52 67 118 20 0 40
Dec09 50 60 110 20 0 35
Jan10 54 91 144 25 0 46
Feb10 50 71 122 20 0 35
Mar10 48 64 111 20 0 35
Apr10 50 91 141 20 0 45
Average monthly change (%)  -1.4 -2.4 -2.0 -2.0   -4.2
Total change (%)  -13.8 -23.0 -19.7 -20.0   -37.3
Notes:  “Panel” consists of individuals who answered 10 or more of the 14 surveys.  Spending refers to the month prior 
to the survey month.  Average monthly change based on regression of log spending on calendar time.  Total change is 
compounded monthly change over eleven months.  Average number of observations is 1894.  
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Table 10 




Percent of credit 






Debt carried over, 
conditional,  
median
Nov08 78.2 41.8 8,540  4,000
Feb09 75.6 43.3 8,383  4,000
May09 77.3 43.2 9,339  5,000
Jun09 76.4 41.1 8,973  5,000
Jul09 75.6 42.2 9,985  5,000
Aug09 75.1 41.6 9,606  5,000
Sep09 76.1 42.8 9,608  5,000
Oct09 73.5 41.8 9,805  5,000
Nov09 75.8 43.4 10,348  5,000
Dec09 75.4 44.3 10,280  5,300
Jan10 74.8 42.7 10,122  5,000
Feb10 75.4 45.5 10,674  5,600
Mar10 74.6 45.2 10,398  5,000
Apr10 74.6 46.6 9,859  5,000
Average monthly change   -0.2 0.2 1.3  1.4
Total change  -2.8 3.8 24.6  27.5
Note:  Average monthly change based on regression of percent or log debt on calendar time.  Total change is 
compounded monthly change over 17 months.  First two columns show percentage point changes;  last two show 
percentage changes.  Observations range between 2030 and 2143. 
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Table 11 
Subjective probability of a stock market gain, cross-section 
 One-year  10-year 
 Mean  Median Mean Median
Nov08 40.3  50.0 60.8 65.0
Feb09 36.6  36.0 58.0 60.0
May09 41.0  50.0 59.4 60.0
Jun09 41.0  50.0 56.9 50.0
Jul09 39.2  45.0 52.8 50.0
Aug09 39.9  45.0 55.2 50.0
Sep09 40.3  50.0 53.6 50.0
Oct09 41.5  50.0 52.3 50.0
Nov09 43.1  50.0 55.3 50.0
Dec09 41.4  50.0 53.2 50.0
Jan10 41.7  50.0 50.8 50.0
Feb10 40.7  50.0 52.3 50.0
Mar10 40.8  50.0 52.0 50.0
Apr10 40.3  50.0 50.4 50.0
Observations range between 1996 and 2118.   35
 
Table 12 
Percent of respondents expressing dissatisfaction, panel 
 Life  satisfaction, 






dissatisfied or very 
dissatisfied
Nov08 --  33.8  44.9 
Feb09 --  33.9  42.4 
May09 7.1  30.2  35.0 
Jun09 7.3  30.7  34.3 
Jul09 7.9  33.7  36.3 
Aug09 9.6  32.9  38.6 
Sep09 9.1  33.4  34.7 
Oct09 9.5  33.4  35.9 
Nov09 9.7  35.4  36.8 
Dec09 10.7  33.2  35.6 
Jan10 10.2  33.2  35.3 
Feb10 11.3  33.2  35.7 
Mar10 11.5  31.3  35.9 
Apr10 10.3  32.0  33.7 
Note: “Panel” consists of individuals who answered 10 or more of the 14 surveys.   Average 
observations are 1817.  Life satisfaction measure in Nov08 and Feb09 not comparable with 
later waves because of difference in scales. 










out all to a 














Nov08 16.0  27.9  25.2  33.8  17.0 
Feb09 16.3  26.1  26.6  29.3  18.4 
May09 13.8  29.0  24.0  31.7  16.5 
Jun09 13.4  23.9  21.1  29.8  16.3 
Jul09 14.2  27.4  21.9  24.9  16.1 
Aug09 13.5  28.8  22.4  26.2  17.6 
Sep09 12.7  28.1  21.8  27.3  15.5 
Oct09 12.9  25.8  23.2  25.6  17.5 
Nov09 15.0  27.4  24.0  25.4  17.2 
Dec09 14.2  28.8  23.9  25.3  16.3 
Jan10 15.5  26.6  23.1  25.4  16.8 
Feb10 14.4  26.9  25.4  24.5  18.0 
Mar10 13.5  27.5  26.4  23.5  17.0 
Apr10 13.5  28.9  25.2  24.7  16.6 
Note:  “Panel” consists of individuals who answered 10 or more of the 14 surveys.  Average N varies between 
1701 and 1888 depending on item. 
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Table 14 
Average subjective probability of working past age 62 (P62), ages 45-61, cross-section 
  Age 45 - 52  Age 53 – 61  All 
 P62  P62   




for pay  Yes No All
Fraction 
working 
for pay  Yes No All  N P62
Nov08   71.3  -- --   71.8 --  --  -- --
Feb09 0.742  67.9  39.6 60.6 0.588  71.9 26.7  53.3  988 57.5
Jul09 0.733  68.1  42.0 61.1 0.567  70.2 29.0  52.4  980 57.5
Oct09 0.792  66.9  37.3 60.7 0.601  69.8 29.8  53.8  932 58.0
Jan10 0.758  69.1  34.6 60.8 0.559  68.7 33.2  53.0  948 57.6
Apr10 0.762  65.2  29.2 56.7 0.570  67.5 28.9  50.9  932 54.3
All 0.757  68.1  36.7 60.0 0.577  70.1 29.5  52.7  4,780 57.0
Note:  N does not include Nov08 observations because in that wave P62 was only asked of workers. 
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Table 15 
Actions taken in response to unemployment, percent 
of households 
Reduced spending  85.2
Reduced saving  46.4
Behind on mortgage  8.6
Behind on rent  16.9
Behind on other bills  36.1
Other 2.4








Replacement for income loss, % of households 
Unemployment benefits  39.2
Took money out of savings  35.6
Financial help from family or friends  27.0
Borrowed money or increased credit card debt  18.0
Respondent took temporary job  13.3
Spouse/partner took temporary job  9.4
None of the above. Found a job soon  8.5
Respondent began working or increased working hours  7.9
Spouse/partner began working or increased working hours 4.5
N= 699 
   39
 
Table 17 
















Average monthly change (percentage points)  -0.1
Total change (percentage points)  -2.2
Note: Average monthly change based on regression of percent probability on calendar time.  Total change 






Average subjective probability of unemployment over next 12 months and actual frequency (%) 
among workers in initial wave, panel 
Initial wave  N Average probability  Actual frequency
Nov08 1188 20.2  19.4
May09 1153 21.9  16.9
Jun09 1161 19.1  13.5
Total 3502 20.4  16.6
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Table 19 
Distribution (%) of homeownership, mortgage ownership, and mortgage delinquency by 
unemployment status 
   Home  owner   
Unemployed Not  home 
owner 





  no  32.2  19.7 46.6 1.5  100.0
  yes  53.6  11.5 31.4 3.5  100.0
Total 34.5  18.8 45.0 1.7  100.0
Note: N = 29,278.  “Unemployed” is unemployed of either respondent or spouse.  
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Table 20 
Spending before (wave t) and after (wave t+1) a household employment transition 
 
  mean spending  median spending   
Employment 
transition 











E to E  14,053 2551  2505 -1.8 2135 2120  -0.7  -0.3
E to U  350 2208  2125 -3.7 1884 1930  2.4  -2.8
U to E  378 2303  2248 -2.4 1931 1853  -4.1  -2.7
U to U  1,587 1883  1850 -1.7 1535 1490  -2.9  -3.0
All 16,368 2460  2415 -1.8 2062 2042  -1.0 -0.6
Note:  Employment transitions of respondent or spouse.  E refers to employed and U refers to 






Spending prior to and following a job loss 
   Mean  Median 
  N  Wave t-3 Wave t percent 
change
Wave t  Wave t+3 percent 
change
No job loss  3,035  2,777 2,731 -1.7 2,270  2,243 -1.2
Job loss, no income loss  40  2,145 1,983 -7.6 1,859  1,840 -1.0
Job loss, income loss  323  2,286 2,019 -11.7 1,925  1,719 -10.7
All 3,398  2,711 2,638 -2.7 2,218  2,173 -2.0
Note:  Respondents are categorized according to whether they lost a job  they wanted to keep as reported in wave t.  The 






Employment transitions and percent of persons with health insurance 
 Singles  Couples  All 
Employment 
transition 
N  wave t  wave t+1 N wave t wave t+1 N  wave t  wave t+1
E to E  3231  82.8  82.9 7705 88.5 88.6 10936  86.5  86.6
E to U  85  55.0  32.4 94 72.7 69.4 179  62.3  47.7
U to E  88  47.2  46.6 121 66.6 69.3 209  56.5  57.5
U to U  532  28.3  29.8 487 60.6 60.4 1019  41.2  42.0
All  3936 72.7  72.3 8407 86.1 86.3 12343 80.9  80.8
Note:  Employment transitions of respondent: E refers to employed and U refers to unemployed. 
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Figure 1.  Housing price indices for four cities and 20-city average 































   43
Figure 2.  Employment transitions, and health and affect 






















































empl to empl empl to unempl unempl to empl unempl to unempl
Initial Wave
Following Wave









empl to empl empl to unempl unempl to empl unempl to unempl
Initial Wave
Following Wave










empl to empl empl to unempl unempl to empl unempl to unempl
Initial Wave
Following Wave  44
Figure 2 continued 















Note: all figures are weighted averages 
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